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Abstract: 
The purpose of this research is to show and to analyze the problems that appeared after the 
Cyprus legislative change οn the 1st January 2003 and mainly to point out the reactions of 
the shareholders of the off - shore companies, due to the changes of the tax legislation. Our 
theoretical model considers that a law in the Capital Market is effective, if it increases the 
expected social prosperity. In our analysis we examined the Bayesian model approach of the 
effectiveness of the law whose base was to analyze the data supports of the opinion from the 
asked company consultants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to fundamental economic principle, states institute laws in order to 
improve society’s affluence (Besley, 2006). Consequently a law is effective if it 
achieves this goal (Karagiorgos, 2003). The Cyprian legislation’s institution of 
offshore companies had without dispute been the most beneficiary for the country. 
Specifically, Cyprus has introduced the estate of “offshore business” (Giles, 2004) 
so as to promote the country as an international business hub. The term «offshore 
business» refers to juridical persons whose beneficiary proprietors do not stay in 
Cyprus and their incomes proceed from activities out of the country. Moreover, were 
not allowed to offer products or services to Cyprus, either to resident population of 
the country or occasional. In addition, it was not allowed to these companies to act 
as intermediaries to trading of foreign products in Cyprus or to work on export of 
Cyprian products. 
 
Till the end of December 2002 there had been totally registered more than 45,000 
offshore companies with the purpose of management and control of enterprising 
activities out of Cyprus and about 11,800 shipping companies with the aim of 
registration ships under Cyprian flag (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2001). 81% from 
these companies came from Europe and 9% from USA and Canada. It is remarked 
that more than 15,000 offshore companies completely acted in international market 
(Iliades, Pashalidis, Hatzianastasiou, 2003). A part of 1,200 from those companies 
employed staff and had set up accomplished offices in Cyprus4. 
 
The Cyprian income in foreign exchange from the offshore businesses during 2002 
was important running up to 668 million euro and forming the 6.6 % of gross 
national product. In this amount, the contribution of shipping administration, which 
is estimated at 30% (Patsalides & Associates, 2003), was significant. 
 
2. Tax Reform in Cyprus 
 
Since 1/1/2003 and after the Cyprian tax reform in July 2002, legislative system 
changed as far as it concerns offshore business; especially ring fencing for activities 
only out of Cyprus, which was applied to offshore companies, was revoked 
((Patsalides & Associates, 2003). It is remarked that the new tax system is entirely 
conformed to directions and guidelines of European Union and Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2003). 
 
                                                 
4 Thessaloniki Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 18 June 2004 
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Specifically5: 
 There is no difference between offshore business and home companies and 
further more the entry of Cyprian companies to the first category is 
permitted. 
Offshore business can be registered in Cyprus in any of the following types: 
 Private Limited Company registered in Cyprus 
 Branch of Foreign Company 
 Co-operative 
 Almost 98% of the registered offshore business is Private Limited 
Companies registered in Cyprus. 
 
A company is considered as tax resident of Cyprus if the control and management 
takes place in the country. 
 
 Single corporate tax 10% is initiated (minimum requisite tax rate by 
Brussels) for all the registered companies in Cyprus (offshore and home 
companies) and it concerns taxable profits which come from commercial 
activities whether all other net income taxes with single rate 15%. Between-
season was given to the offshore companies which had income during 2001 
exclusively from external or it is expected to have incomes which have not 
arisen till 31st December 2001 due to the kind of their businesses in order to 
decide whether they will change to Cyprian companies or to terminate their 
activities as off shore companies. These companies have the right to 
continue to be taxed selectively with rate 4.25% till 31/12/2005. It is pointed 
that until 31/12/2005 the companies’ tax rate was for Cyprian companies 
20% for taxable profits up to 40,000 Cyprian pounds and 25% for the extra 
incomes.    
 A registered company in Cyprus can be either resident of the country for tax 
purposes so as to be taxed annually with rate 10% on the net profits or 
foreign and he is not taxed in Cyprus because the administration is out of the 
country for more of 165 days per year. It is noticed that a company is 
considered to be Cyprian company if the decisions and the management take 
place in Cyprus (for example the board of directors meets in Cyprus). In this 
case it is recommended the nomination of Cyprian directors. 
 They are not liable to tax deduction payments out of country (at companies 
or juridical persons) whether they are shares, interests or rights. 
 Shares and profit from permanent premises out of the country are excluded 
from the taxation if they fulfill some conditions (the company’s 
administration takes place out of Cyprus and the Managing Directors stay 
permanently in Cyprus for a period of time less of 180 days per year).  
                                                 
5 Brochure No 20 - Totalserve Management Ltd, Limassol, Cyprus 
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 Compensation of losses among companies of the same business group is 
allowed (in case of dependence higher of 75%). Also the limitation of 
losses’ transfer for only 5 years is revoked.  
 Profits which come from sale of real property out of Cyprus releases from 
taxation. 
 The possession of shares by succession in Cyprian offshore company is not 
burdened with succession duties. 
 Reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions of companies are revoked from 
taxation. 
It is important to notice that the tax reform was viewed necessary by Cyprian 
Government so as to conform the legislation to the Common vested, to achieve 
compliance with the Code of Ethics about companies’ taxation and to effectuate the 
obligations to OECD. 
As far as it concerns other details about companies, we have to comment the 
following: 
 The stock of companies has to be divided at least to one (1) share and to be 
one standard shareholder who can be natural entity, company or trust6 
(Antoine, 2005). 
The shares can be held by trustees for account of beneficiary shareholders. 
 
3. Tax Reform’s Impacts on Cyprian Offshore Companies 
 
As it is referred above, since 1975, when Cyprus initiated the estate of offshore 
companies (Giles, 2004) for first time (Tornaritis, 1984), until 1/1/2003 when the 
legislation about offshore activities changed, there were 45,000 offshore companies 
in action. 
 
The most important change was the increase of profits’ tax rate from 4.25% to 10% 
which remains the same both for the taxation of incomes from commercial activities 
in and out of the country. 
 
A research was carried out by Melas, during his doctoral thesis (Melas, 2008), in 
order to show probable change in offshore companies’ behavior, which acted until 
then in Cyprus, and also the activity of new international business after the tax 
reform. 
                                                 
6 A trust is begun by someone who is called “trust-giver” and is a mode whereby property (“trust-
property”) is held by one or more people (“trustees”) for account somebody or for beneficiaries or for 
specific purposes. Even if trustees are the proprietors of trust-property, they cannot administer it as 
absolute owners due to the fact that they have the obligation to conform to the terms of law and the 
trust’s report. The property of trust can consists of any kind of asset everywhere in the world. 
(definition by PriceWaterhouseCoopers - Cyprus as a financial center – the connection with Greece) 
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The purpose of this research is to highlight and elaborate the problems of tax reform 
and mainly the shareholders’ responses of offshore companies due to change of tax 
system, transactions’ secrecy and confidence among natural persons. 
 
It is obvious that due to extremely big amount of offshore companies which act in 
Cyprus with Greek interests, the responses have repercussions on Greek economy 
with relation to reforms of law 3091/20027 in our country which was initiated in an 
effort to measure tax evasion and tax avoidance (Melas, 1997) that occurred through 
offshore companies. The research was conducted through interviews by the use of 
questionnaires, took apart thirteen consultant’s offices that represent 6,068 offshore 
and international Cyprian companies. 
 
Briefly the results of research are appeared as follows: 
 
Consultants’ 
offices 
No of 
represe
nted 
offshor
e 
compan
ies 
No of 
offshore 
companies 
which 
became 
internatio
nal 
business 
Number 
of 
offshore 
compani
es which 
changed 
country 
Set 
Trus
ts 
Commercial 
reasons to 
keep an 
offshore 
company 
Keeping 
an 
offshore 
company 
in order to 
evade tax 
Employed 
staff of 
offshore 
companies 
Mihailidis 
and 
Marnerou 
C.O. 
(Limassol) 
50 0 0 48 0 50 10 
Abraham 
Marios 
Partners & 
Go 
608 0 0 2 608 0 0 
Ernst & 
Young 
500 0 0 175 200 300 40 
Kountouri 
and Elisseou 
60 0 0 0 30 30 10 
Pavlidis 200 60 20 160 20 180 6 
Ntinos 
Antoniou 
300 270 3 240 30 270 10 
Price 
Waterhouse 
Coopers -  
Limassol 
300 200 10 300 75 225 50 
                                                 
7 Taxation of income individual and legal Entities (Greek Law 2238/1994) 
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Price 
Waterhouse 
Coopers -  
Nicosia 
500 0 0 0 450 50 50 
Kiriakou and 
Tsiartas 
100 0 0 1 70 30 15 
Fotiou and 
Efthivoulou 
and 
Koutsoftas 
3.000 1500 0 900 1200 1800 5 
Geniva 
Group 
350 10 0 0 245 105 30 
Ledra 
Management 
60 20 0 15 54 6 3 
Nikos 
Voskaridis 
40 0 0 0 4 36 9 
SUM 6068 2060 33 
184
1 
2986 3082 238 
AVERAGE 
NON 
WEIGHTET 
466,769
2 
158,4615 
2,53846
2 
141,
615
4 
229,6923 237,0769 18,30769 
POPULATI
ON 
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
MAXIMUM 3000 1500 20 900 1200 1800 50 
MINIMUM 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 
STANDAR
D 
DEVIATIO
N 
764,214
4 
398,0932 
6,36611
9 
243,
532
6 
338,0471 465,8355 17,19778 
INCLINATI
ON 
288,087
9 
18,35165 
3,95604
4 
101,
428
6 
181,4286 106,6593 17,91209 
VARIATIO
N 
616759 170047,4 35,4359 
629
70,4
2 
120165,4 231200,9 318,2308 
 
4. Statistical Analysis of Cyprian Law’s Effectiveness 
 
4.1. The theoretical model 
Let’s assume that in capital market are joined n consultants’ offices and that each 
and every one represents a number of offshore companies. Portfolio management 
depends on degrees of integration as has been pointed out by Thalassinos and 
Kiriazidis (2003). 
 
The profit of each office is expressed by a function u ,  which depends positively 
on the number of offshore companies it represents. In other words ui (hi) where hi is 
the number of companies that the office represents and i = 1, …, n. Let for assume 
convenience that ui = hi. 
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The variable h is random with probability density function φ(h), cumulative 
distribution function Φ(h) and values hi є R+. (David, 2008). 
 
As we understand from the model, the existence of offshore companies offers 
economic benefit to the host country. Specially, it is considered that as the number 
of offshore companies is increased, the total economic profit is increased too. It is 
also assumed that the government cares about society’s affluence; this means that 
economic distribution through which all consultants’ offices represent a number of 
off shore companies is preferred to another distribution according to which 
consultant offices represent any other company. So, society’s affluence is expresses 
by function  
Ω(ui, …, un):=Ω(h), 
Where, 
: 0i
iu

  

 and  
2
2
: 0ii
iu
 
  

 for i=1, …, n. 
 
It is assumed that government initiates laws in order to improve society’s welfare. 
Thereby, if a law’s enforcement in capital market influences the contribution of 
companies then the law is (economically) efficient as it achieves his goal. 
Let φ(h) and φ’(h) be the contributions of offshore companies before and after the 
enforcement of a law in the market. 
 
Further, is given the definition of law’s efficiency and an empirical method to 
examine and verify it is introduced. 
Definition: A law in capital market is called «efficient» if increases the expected 
affluence of society. Moreover the law is effective if the following formula s in 
force: 
( ) ( )
h
h h dh

    ( ) ( )
h
h h dh


 
Proposition: If the following conditions (i) and (ii) are in effect then the law is 
efficient. 
  +
0
( ) ( )  0 ,  
h
d h        
 
0
( ) ( )  0 d  

    
Proof 
The conditions (i) and (ii) show that for each value of h the area of cumulative 
distribution Φ΄ is smaller than distribution of Φ. In other words Φ has bigger 
dispersion than Φ΄. So it can be said that the conditions (i) and (ii) show that 
contribution φ has higher cusps than φ΄. 
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It is familiar that function Ω has maximum to the point where Ω (h) = 0 and it is 
reached when h1 = h2 = hn. This means that function of society’s affluence is 
increased through the decrease of the contribution’s Φ variability.  
 
So, from conditions (i) and (ii) we conclude that average welfare of society increases 
as variability increases, ceteris paribus and so: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
h h
h d h h d h
  
       
or the same 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
h h
h h dh h h dh 
  
      
which means that law is effective. 
 
The proposition postulates that if average of contributions remains the same then 
law’s effectiveness depends on the decrease of dispersion. Of course, if dispersion 
remains invariable, then the existence of effectiveness leads to increase of the 
distribution’s average. 
 
In other words the proposition shows that effectiveness of law depends on the 
comparison of companies’ contributions before and after its enforcement. 
Consequently the efficiency of law can be examined empirically through the 
assessment of contributions’ parameters from which observations are derived. 
 
4.2. The empirical results 
 
The variables which are used are:  
 LYP = the logarithm of the population of offshore companies for each office 
before law’s enforcement. 
 LY1 = the logarithm of the population of offshore companies for each office 
that did not became Cyprian after law’s enforcement. 
 LY2 = the logarithm of the population of offshore companies for each office 
that did not change country after law’s enforcement. 
 LY = the logarithm of the population of offshore companies for each office 
that neither became Cyprian nor changed country after law’s enforcement. 
 Initially the sample of each variable was examined so as to find from which 
population comes. 
 
The test of data’s adaptiveness in theoretical distributions is done by the use of 
statistics Χ2. The results are in the Table 1. 
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Table 1: Sample Adaptiveness Test 
 
Using significance level 10% (α = 0.1), it is founded that null hypothesis is in effect 
only for Weibull contribution. So the empirical data leads to the conclusion that each 
variable follows Weibull contribution. 
The probability density function of Weibull contribution is: 
1 xx
e






   
  , 
Where, α, β > 0 are parameters of contributions. 
Also the cumulative probability function is: 1
x
e


 
 
   
 
The assessment of Weibull parameters by me method of Maximum Likelihood leads 
to valuators ˆ  and ˆ   that derives from resolution of the next equation system: 
1ˆ
ˆ1
1
ˆ
n
i
i
n x





 
  
 
  , 
1
ˆ1
1 1
ˆ ˆ  log log
n n
i i i
i i
n x x x 


 
 
  
 
   
The values of parameters α and β which are found by observations of variables are 
appeared in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Values of Contribution’s Parameters 
 
From the values, everyone hundredth part θ can be counted. Especially the 
estimation of hundredth part θ of Weibull contribution comes from the connection: 
Contribution Critical Value 
(Probability) 
Critical Value 
(Probability) 
Critical Value 
(Probability) 
Critical Value 
(Probability) 
 LYP LY1 LY2 LY 
Normal 8,15  (0,017) 3,54  (0,170) 2,77  (0,250) 3,54  (0,170) 
Exponential 21,06 (0,000) 21,09  (0,000) 21,05  (0,000) 19,53  (0,000) 
Gamma 5,07  (0,079) 3,54  (0,170) 5,08  (0,079) 2,77  (0,250) 
Logistic 5,08  (0,079) 3,54  (0,170) 5,08  (0,079) 2,00  (0,368) 
Log-Normal 5,08  (0,079) 3,54  (0,170) 5,08  (0,079) 2,00  (0,368) 
Weibull 3,54  (0,170) 3,54  (0,170) 3,54  (0,170) 3,54  (0,170) 
Laplace 5,08  (0,079) 4,31  (0,116) 4,31  (0,116) 6,62  (0,037) 
Value LYP LY1 LY2 LY 
(scale)  ˆ  5,85331 5,4778 5,84195 5,45326 
(shape)  ˆ  4,77653 4,46966 4,75234 4,38513 
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 
0
1  
k
P X k e d


  
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
Some values of hundredth parts are appeared in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Hundred Parts of Contribution 
 
Hundred Part LYP LY1 LY2 LY 
5 3,143 2,818 3,127 2,770 
10 3,654 3,311 3,638 3,264 
25 4,509 4,145 4,495 4,106 
50 5,421 5,047 5,408 5,016 
60 5,747 5,372 5,735 5,346 
75 6,268 5,893 6,258 5,875 
90 6,970 6,602 6,963 6,596 
95 7,365 7,002 7,359 7,004 
 
From the results of the above table it is clear that the following in equation is 
applied:  
+
0 0
( )  ( )  ,  
h h
d d h         , which shows the effectiveness of 
law. So the results appear that in any way law is ineffective. 
 
4.3. Assessment of linear model 
Let’s assumed that h’ is random variable which shows the contribution of offshore 
companies at consultants’ offices after law’s enforcement (Pierce D.A. and Schaefer 
D. W., 1986). 
 
It is assumed also that values Χ of random variable h, before law’s implementation, 
are connected with values Y of variable h’ through the type: Y = αΧβε where ε is 
random variable with logarithm – normal distribution and α,  are parameters of that. 
Using logarithm the type becomes:  
 
log Y = log α + β log X + log ε or  
y = c + βx +e          (1) 
 
where, y :=log Y, x :=log X, c:= log α and e :=log ε. 
 
If the law has no influence there are no differences between the values of h’ and h. 
In this case α = 1 and β = 1 are true.This means empirically that at test of hypothesis 
c = 0 and β = 1 in linear model (1). 
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Table 4 shows the results of model’s (1) assessment through least squares method. 
 
Table 4: Estimation OLS of Linear Model 
 
LY1 = 0,32+0,87LYP      0,683    0,857r   
                                                 (0,37) (5,51) 
LY2 = 0,01+0,99LYP      0,031    0,999r   
                                               (0,24)  (139) 
LY = 0,31+0,86LYP      0,720    0,843r   
                                                 (0,34) (5,21) 
 
The value of statistic t is in brackets, σ is the regression standard error and r is 
correlation coefficient. It is clear that inclination of linear model is statistically 
significant in contrast with invariable average which in any way was important. 
 
Next, proof of hypothesis is done: 
Ho : c = 0, β = 1 
Η1 : c ≠ 0 or / and β ≠ 1  
 
The values of test X
2
 values of probability and degrees of freedom are 
showed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Test X
2 
 
 Critical Value  Probability Degrees of 
Freedom 
LY1 4,6179 0,0994 2 
LY2 1,7769 0,4113 2 
LY 4,7333 0,0938 2 
 
The values of test F, the degrees of freedom and the probability’s values that comes 
from regression’s residues and the method bootstrapping, are appeared in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Test F 
 
 Critical 
Value 
Probability Bootstrapping Bootstrapping:Simulated Normal 
Errors 
D.F. 
LY1 2,3089 0,1455 0,632 0,149 2, 11 
LY2 0,8884 0,4389 0,829 0,425 2, 11 
LY 2,3666 0,1397 0,659 0,125 2, 11 
 
Using significance level 10%, from tables 5 and 6, it is comprehensible that 
according test X 2 null hypothesis is almost rejected for variables LY1 and LY. In 
contrast with this, null hypothesis is accepted in all the cases of test F. Because test 
X2 has gratifying qualities, for large sample, than F, which is preferred for small, 
The Effectiveness of a Law and Society’s Affluence: 
The Paradox of Cyprian 
 
61 
null hypothesis seems to be supported by data for all the variables. So from tests’ 
results we conclude that law has no influence as it did not change first distribution. 
 
4.4. Adequacy of linear model 
It is necessary condition, for the empirical solidity of linear model, to view that it is 
not subsidiary than other no-linear model. Specially, if a no-linear model explains 
sample’s features that linear model cannot then linear model is subsidiary to no-
linear. In other words no-linear model offers «information» by empirical 
observations which cannot be offered by linear model. But if linear model re-
produces the results of no-linear, it is viewed that the first has empirical solidity. 
 
So it is not desirable to have some other model, e.g. Γ2, which explains sample’s 
features that linear model, e.g. Γ1, cannot. This comparison of samples derives from 
the need to answer the query whether used model Γ1 is adequate. The positive 
answer means that there is no model Γ2 which has information about sample that are 
not involved to Γ1. So, in order to be reliable, model Γ1 must not fall short of 
information in comparison with the competitive models. This practically means that 
Γ1 explains results of larger model from which can be derived. Practically model’s 
solidity means that the largest model can lead to estimated linear model without loss 
of important information. 
 
To decide whether linear model Γ1 is reliable or not, firstly some no-linear models 
were studied so as to choose from the data the most reliable e.g. Γ2. Next, general 
model 1 2M     was created, which consists of information of both models. 
Consequently, the assumption of Γ1 linear model’s solidity is done by test X
2 and 
shows whether general model can become linear or not, representing it as 1M   
 
where 1 M   
 
So as to find a model that explains efficiently empirical data, the model which 
minimized the sum squares of (studentized) residuals, was chosen. The models are 
showed in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: No-linear Models Estimation 
 
 Model 2  Model  M  
LY1 7,7/54,5 xy x      0,673                                                                 
0,861r   
6 78,9/0,92 7.10 xy x x        
0,706     
                                                    0,862r   
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LY2  3 20,16 0,94 5,6.10y x x        
0,0307     
                                                    0,999r   
LY 7,7/55 xy x          0,708                                    
0,849r   
80,9/0,91 54,5 xy x x                 
0,743     
                                                   0,849r   
  
Linear model’s solidity test is appeared in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Linear Model’s Solidity Test 
 
 
Test 
2X  Probability D.F. 
LY1 0,1418 0,706 1 
LY2 0,0012 0,972 1 
LY 0,1828 0,669 1 
  
We understand, from the table, the solidity of linear model which was used and this 
enhances the conclusions of linear model’s estimation. 
 
4.5. Bayesian study of law’s influence 
Using Bayes’ regression helps to involve previous information about rates’ values to 
the results of normal regression. Specially, if there is prior information about these 
values, it can be used to improve posterior estimates. 
 
The model (1) was estimated by Bayes’ regression and two basic conditions of prior 
information. Especially, in the first case, it is assumed that information is diffused 
because it does not offer essential contribution to specific coefficients’ values 
(diffuse priors). In contrast with this case, in the second one it is assumed that there 
is essential information which is referred to specific coefficients’ values of model 
(informative priors). The procession of model’s (1) estimation and its statistical 
properties are presented thoroughly by Zellner A. (1971). According to Table 9, 
Bayes’ estimation of model (1) without specific prior information, does not 
differentiate found values of c and β in relation with classical least squares 
regression. (see Table 4). 
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Table 9: Linear Model’s Estimation by Bayes’ theory (diffuse priors) 
 
LY1 = 0,3231 + 0,8698LYP 
(0,336)  (4,985) 
LY2 =  0,0094 + 0,9996LYP 
( 0,216)  (125,8) 
LY = 0,3121 + 0,8667LYP 
(0,308)  (4,711) 
  
Table 10 shows the 95% (posterior) of confidence interval of c and β. As it is 
appeared in this table, these confidence intervals leads to acceptance of hypothesis c 
= 0 and β = 1. 
 
Table 10: 95% Bayes’ Confidence Interval (diffuse priors) 
 
 Coefficients Confidence Interval 
LY1 c  
  
1,588   -    2,234  
  0,522   -   1,217  
LY2 c  
  
0,096   -    0,077  
  0,984   -    1,015  
LY c  
  
1,703   -    2,327  
  0,501   -    1,233  
 
Because of the fact that the model (1) coefficients’ estimations do not show 
improvement in comparison with classical regression, next they are estimated by the 
use of information about their probable values. So the initial perception of 
coefficients’ values is included in the process of estimation by the use of 
contribution function that was assumed previously.  
 
Consequently, Bayes’ regression by informative priors is done with the assumption 
that coefficients c and β follow the normal distribution with averages 0 and 1. The 
estimations of coefficients that are based on that information are sowed in Table 11. 
So it is clear that posterior estimations improved the view of coefficients. Especially 
value of coefficient c was decreased and β was increased in relation with previous 
estimators. Also statistical significance of β was improved whether no-significance 
of co-efficient c was enhanced more. 
 
Table 11: Normal Likelihood Function (informative priors)  
 
LY1 = 0,1173 + 0,9064LYP 
                                                           (0,216)  (8,887) 
LY2 =  0,0094 + 0,9996LYP         
                                                          ( 0,136)  (139,3) 
LY = 0,1044 + 0,9036LYP         
                                                           (0,189)  (8,658) 
International Journal of Economics & Business Administration, I (3), 2013 
T. Karagiorgos - D. Melas - L. Fasitsas 
 
64 
The same conclusions come from Table 12 which shows the percentage of 95% 
(posterior) confidence interval of each coefficient. The estimation of intervals is 
more accurate as their range is closer than the range of Table’s 10 intervals. So the 
conclusion is that use of Bayes’ regression by informative priors led to improvement 
of estimators’ accuracy and enhanced the hypothesis of null average and one point 
inclination of model (1). 
 
Table 12: 95% Bayesian Confidence Interval (informative priors) 
 
 Coefficient Confidence Interval       
LY1 c  
  
0,960   -    1,195  
  0,704   -   1,109  
LY2 c  
  
0,088   -    0,069  
  0,985   -    1,014  
LY c  
  
0,994   -    1,203  
  0,696   -    1,111  
 
Further use of Bayesian regression’s results was done to test the hypothesis of law’s 
no-influence (e.g. c = 0 and β = 1) through test F. 
 
   
Table 13: Test F 
 
 Diffuse priors Informative priors 
LY1 2,309 (0,145) 2,269 (0,150) 
LY2 0,889 (0,439) 0,889 (0,439) 
LY 2,367 (0,139) 1,367 (0,295) 
 
From table 13, using level of significance 10%, it is seen that test’s F results lead 
again to acceptance of null hypothesis. So, Bayesian data analysis supports that law 
has no influence to the differentiation of offshore companies’ distribution.  
 
4.6. Trust and law’s influence 
This paragraph deals with the factors which influence the number of set trusts. Using 
Probit analysis it is tested whether the number of trusts is influenced by commercial 
factors or / and tax-evasion causes. In order to estimate model, variable I is used, 
which gets values 0 and 1 if observation’s value about set trusts is lower or higher 
than median respectively. This means that variable I divide the observations to two 
categories: one with small number of trusts, which has value 0, and the second one 
which has large number of trusts and value 1. The Probit estimated model is: I = βX 
where X is independent variable, namely the commercial or tax-evasion factors. The 
results of Probit regression are appeared in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Probit Estimation about Set Trusts 
 
Commercial Factors                            Tax-Evasion Factors 
Ι = 
52,3.10 Χ 
(0,027) 
Ι = 
34,6.10 Χ 
                            (11,6) 
 
From the table’s results we understand that independent variable about commercial 
factors is statistically non-significant in comparison to the variable referring to tax-
evasion factors. So the population of trusts depends on tax evasion causes. 
Moreover, large number of trusts correlates positively with tax-evasion incentives.  
 
Next it is researched whether offshore companies’ actions differentiate accordingly 
to population of set trusts; so according to tax-evasion incentives. 
 
For this purpose model (1) was estimated, without constant term, by least squares 
method:  
Y = βx + e      (2)  
 
Estimation of coefficient β (model 2) appears in Table 15. It is clear from regression 
results that all estimations of β are statistical significant with values close to one 
point. Furthermore the estimations of correlation coefficients and regression’s 
standard error are not different from the estimations of model (1). 
 
Table 15: OLS Estimation of Linear Model 
 
LY1 = 0,927LYP      0,658    0,854r   
                                            (27,96)  
LY2 = 0,998LYP      0,029    0,999r   
                                              (663) 
LY = 0,922LYP      0,693    0,842r   
                                            (26,4) 
 
Consequently, empirical conclusions proved the hypothesis of null constant term 
and one point inclination for model (1); this enhances the conclusions of previous 
paragraphs about law’s no-influence. 
 
The invariability of coefficient β was made by Chow test, whereby observations 
where divided in two subgroups according to variable I. So, null hypothesis stage 
that its value is same for all samples. In other words coefficient’s value remains 
same (invariable) in both subgroups. The acceptance of null hypothesis means that 
offshore companies with many trusts behave in the same way with the companies 
which have small population of trusts. 
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The results of variable’s β test constancy are showed in Table 16. Using level of 
significance 10% it is concluded that test is important for all the variables except for 
LY2. This means that null variable becomes accepted only by the observation which 
concern variable LY2. So empirical results lead to the conclusion that coefficient β 
is not constant for the variables LY1 and LY2. In other words it seems that 
companies’ behavior differ accordingly to the population of trusts. 
 
Table 16: Test Constancy (Chow-break test) 
 
 Test F Test Likelihood ratio Test  Wald 
LY1 3,829  (0,076) 3,883  (0,049) 3,829  (0,050) 
LY2 1,707  (0,218) 1,876  (0,171) 1,707  (0,191) 
LY 4,117  (0,067) 4,133  (0,042) 4,117  (0,043) 
  
In order to test the solidity of coefficient β it was tried to find specific (no-linear) 
models which explain more efficiently the data of both models. The fitting of model 
in any sample was achieved based on minimization of least squares sum 
(studentized) residuals. 
 
Models’ estimations, standard error and correlation coefficient are showed in Table 
17. From this table it seems that each model fits well to empirical data. Next 
derivation of each function was counted to the point which is equal to the average of 
extrinsic variable. In other words we tried to search whether the average change of 
variable x has the same influence on internal variable y without regard to sample. 
Table 18 appears the variable’s x estimated changes at their average value as they 
are counted by each sample. 
 
Table 17: Estimation of Gratifying Fitting Model 
 
 
 0I   1I   
LY1 84,2
90,5
x
y
x



     0,156                                                                 
0,993r   
 
1
0,032 0,39y x

                    
0,897   
                                                      0,836r   
LY2  
y x   
1
20,54 0,95 0,005y x x

       
0,028   
                                                      0,999r   
LY 84,2
90,5
x
y
x



         0,156                                                                 
0,993r   
 
1
0,033 0,4y x

                    
0,925   
                                                     0,833r   
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From table 18 we see that external variable’s influence on internal one is different 
for LY1 and LY whether is almost the same for LY2. The conclusions of Table 18 
agree with Table’s 16 results about constancy’s test of linear regression variable. So 
it seems again that companies’ behavior with many trusts is not the same with those 
which have low population of trusts. 
Table 18: Estimation of Derivation  
x x
dy
dx 
 
 0I   1I   
LY1 1,0423 0,7517 
LY2 1 1,1185 
LY 1,0423 0,7611 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
1. Law is (financially) ineffective. 
2. There is positive correlation between trust and tax evasion. Especially tax 
evasion factors lead to high number of trusts. 
3. Companies’ (consultant offices) behavior with small quantity of trusts 
seems to be different from the behavior of companies with many trusts. 
4. The behavior of companies (consultant offices) with different trust quantity 
appears to differ before and after law’s enforcement. Especially low number 
trust companies do not change. In contrast with these companies, high 
number trust companies change their actions. This leads to the conclusion 
that law probably has influence on companies whose incentive is tax 
evasion. 
5. Translocation of an offshore company in another country is a decision does 
not seem to be influenced by law’s enforcement or by tax evasion factors (it 
is due to other reasons). On the contrary to this, tax-evasion reasons 
influenced the decision to turn a company into a Cyprian one.  
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